LANHAM ACT § 43(a): THE SLEEPING
GIANT IS NOW WIDE AWAKE
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY*

I
INTRODUCTION

Today, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act1 is the preeminent federal law for
asserting claims in private litigation against two distinct types of "unfair
competition": (1) infringement of unregistered trademarks, service marks, trade
names, and trade dress, and (2) false advertising and product disparagement.
This status of statutory preeminence was reached only gradually over the past
fifty years by judicial interpretation of seemingly narrow and innocuous
statutory language. It was the federal courts that filled section 43(a) with this
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1. The original version of § 43(a), effective as part of the Lanham Act beginning on July 5, 1947,
read as follows:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services,
or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent
the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who
shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to
any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of
any such false description or representation.
Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946).
The present version of § 43(a) as rewritten effective in 1989 and as renumbered by the 1992
amendment is as follows:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Id. (as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-542 § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3568 (1992)). Note that § 43(a)(2) is omitted
here. It was added by a 1992 amendment, imposing liability on a state for violation of § 43(a) and, in
the course of doing so, renumbering the paragraphs of § 43(a). Pub. L. No. 102- 542, §3(b), 106 Stat.
3567 (1992). After the 1992 renumbering, the "two prongs" of § 43(a) are § 43(a)(1)(A) (unregistered
trade symbol infringement) and § 43(a)(1)(B) (false advertising and product disparagement).
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new and potent content. In a half-century, section 43(a) has undergone an
amazing transformation at the hands of the federal judiciary. Section 43(a) has
risen from obscurity as a largely ignored subsection of the Trade Registration
Act in 1945 to today's unrivaled legal instrument to combat unfair competition.
This was given a congressional stamp of approval in the 1989 revisions to the
Lanham Act metamorphosis.
Section 43(a) has become the standard vehicle for assertions of infringement
of unregistered trade dress in the appearance and shape of both containers and
products. After a period of protectionistic expansion, the federal courts are now
devising rules and tightening requirements in order to put limits on claims of
trade dress infringement. The case law trend is now flowing in favor of the
competitive copier. The courts have begun to realize that over-expansive
recognition of trade dress rights creates the danger of interfering with the fine
balance of free versus fair competition that the intellectual property system
attempts to preserve. Thus, today, while some criticize section 43(a) as a loose
cannon on the deck of the ship of intellectual property, others laud it as an
appropriately powerful weapon in the never-ending battle against advertising
and sales devices that cause consumer confusion and deception.
Fifty years after the effective date of the Lanham Act, the proper use and
scope of section 43(a) has become a hotly debated issue in the intellectual
property field. Is this amazing change in section 43(a) a positive development
in the war on unfair competition and consumer confusion or is it an unwarranted expansion of exclusive rights, shrinking the store of available symbols and
designs that are necessary for the kind of free competition that will benefit
consumer welfare?
II
THE HUMBLE BEGINNINGS OF SECTION

43(a)

A. The Modest Goal of the Drafters
Although the Lanham Act itself has a "very long and convoluted legislative
history," the legislative record is slight with respect to section 43(a), and what
is there is inconclusive.2 While bills leading up to the Lanham Act were the
subject of debate and discussion for decades, there is almost no mention of the
subject matter of section 43(a).
The statutory predecessor of section 43(a) was a little known and seldom
used provision of the Act of 1920. That provision required proof of willfulness
and an intent to deceive.' A comparison of section 43(a) with its predecessor,

2. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that the
legislative history of § 43(a) is "inconclusive and therefore of little or no help in resolving" the issue
of consumer standing).
3. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 778 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(Because of its limitations, § 3 of the 1920 Act "was destined for oblivion."); Walter J. Derenberg,
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section 3 of the 1920 Trademark Act, shows the perceived weaknesses of the
earlier Act and the steps taken by Congress to remedy those inadequacies.4
First, the elements of willfulness and an intent to deceive were no longer
required to support a claim for relief.5 Second, the scope of protection was
expanded to include false descriptions or representations in addition to false
designations of origin. And, third, section 43(a)' 6extended the prohibition to
falsity in connection with "any goods or services.
Daphne Robert Leeds, whose efforts greatly contributed to the passage,
interpretation, and enforcement of the Lanham Act, anticipated that acquisition
and enforcement of unregistered trademark rights would remain limited to the
laws of the states.7 To ensure national protection and access to the federal
courts, she felt that federal registration was a necessity.
As to false advertising, she believed that section 43(a) created a cause of
action for any person doing business in a locality against any other person who
is falsely using the name of the locality as a place of origin of their product.8
Thus, she felt that section 43(a) was limited in its applications to instances
where the advertiser claimed the product originated in a place it did not. This
seemed to be the conventional wisdom in 1946 as to the scope of section 43(a). 9
With the benefit of hindsight, we see now that "false origin" was read by the
courts to connote not only geographical origin but also manufacturing origin,

Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or
Epilogue?,32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1029, 1035 (1957) (stating that § 3 of the Act of 1920 was a "dead letter").
4. Section 3 of the Trademark Act of 1920 provided:
That any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, or annex, or use
in connection with any article or articles of merchandise, or any container or containers of the
same, a false designation of origin, including words or other symbols, tending to falsely identify
the origin of the merchandise and shall then cause such merchandise to enter into interstate
or foreign commerce, and any person who shall knowingly cause or procure the same to be
transported in interstate or foreign commerce or commerce with Indian tribes, or shall
knowingly deliver the same to any carrier to be so transported, shall be liable to an action at
law for damages and to an action in equity to an injunction, at the suit of any person, firm,
or corporation doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or in the region
in which said locality is situated, or at the suit of any association of such persons, firms, or
corporations.
Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 534.
5. Congress purposefully removed the elements of willfulness and intent to deceive from section
43(a). See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), aftd, 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (ruling that § 43(a) created "a statutory federal tort, sui generis, and to this extent [the plaintiff]
need not show that any false description or representation was willful or intentional").
6. See CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LANHAM ACT § 43(A) § 1.02 (1995 rev. ed.).
7. DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADEMARK MANUAL 225 (1947) ("[T]he acquisition and
enforcement of rights are limited to the laws of the States in the absence of a federal registration.
There are thousands of good marks in use in this country which are not registered.").
8. Id. at 188.
9. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 777 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[Tihe word 'origin' refers to the geographic location in which the goods originated, and in fact, the
phrase 'false designation of origin' was understood to be limited to false advertising of geographic
origin."). Justice Stevens gave the example of a false claim in advertising that California oranges came
from Florida, or vice versa. Id.
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thereby transforming section 43(a) into a statute providing a federal forum and
injunctive and monetary remedies for unregistered trademark infringement.
At the time the Lanham Act was enacted, its supporters seemed to view
section 43(a) as a relatively insignificant section, useful to ease the restrictive
requirements of proof required in common law false advertising cases.1 ° The
future expansive possibilities of section 43(a) were only vaguely perceived at
that time. As Leeds noted in 1947 of false advertising and section 43(a): "[Tlhe
extent to which this field may be developed remains to be seen.""l There was
no indication that the drafters thought that section 43(a) could or would become
the basis for a federal claim of infringement of unregistered marks or trade
dress.
B. Section 44: The Hope for a Federal "Unfair Competition" Law
The drafters and promoters of the 1947 Lanham Act, especially Edward S.
Rogers, 2 strongly felt that the new Act should create a general federal law of
unfair competition. This was in part a reaction to the 1938 Erie Railroad
Supreme Court decision, which, it was believed, had eliminated the existing
body of federal unfair competition common law. Rogers and others argued
that section 44 of the Act should be interpreted so as to create a federal claim
giving all private parties a right to sue in federal court for damage caused by
alleged acts of "unfair competition."14 Leeds agreed, arguing that section 44
of the Lanham Act "makes an action for unfair competition relief a statutory
right of action and protection will be granted under the federal law and not
limited to the common law of the [s]tates. ' '15 Leeds quoted congressional
hearings in which Rogers argued to the House Committee that the intent of
section 44 was to implement in U.S. federal law a general prohibition against
"unfair competition."16
The irony of judicial history is that while the hopes and dreams for section
44 as a federal law of unfair competition never materialized, its then unnoticed
sibling section, section 43(a), was destined to fulfill, albeit to a more limited
extent, the hopes of those who sought a more expansive federal role in the
battle against unfair competition. Like an unappreciated child laboring in the

10. ROBERT, supra note 7, at 183-86. For relevant legislative history of § 43(a), see Derenberg,
supra note 3, at 1036-39 and Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971).
11. ROBERT, supra note 7, at 186.
12. Rogers played an important role in the drafting and passage of the Lanham Act. See 1 J.
THoMAs MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5.04, at 5-11 (3d ed. 1995).
13. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that there is no federal common law of unfair competition). But
see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (Federal common law is used when
a "federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely federal interests" or where "Congress has
given the courts the power to develop substantive law.").
14. See Edward S. Rogers's introduction to ROBERT, supra note 7, at xv-xx (quoting Rogers's
congressional testimony at 170-77 and Robert's identical views at 178-80).
15. ROBERT, supra note 7, at 177.
16. Id. at 170-77 (quoting Rogers's congressional testimony).
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shadow of a favored sibling, section 43(a) was eventually to steal the spotlight.
As early as 1957, Professor Derenberg could state with remarkable foresight
that section 44 was epilogue and section 43(a) was the prologue of a federal law
of unfair competition.17
C. The Rise and Fall of Section 44
From 1950 until 1980, in the western portion of the United States, Edward
S. Rogers's dreams of a federal private remedy against all kinds of "unfair
competition" were realized. By an ingenious reading of section 44 of the
Lanham Act,18 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stauffer v.
Exley' 9 held that the Act created a federal question whenever an act of unfair
competition was committed that affected interstate commerce.2"
Every other circuit that considered this issue rejected the Ninth Circuit's
rule. 1 These other circuits reasoned that if Congress really intended to make
such a far-reaching change as to make a federal question of any and all acts of
unfair competition in interstate commerce, it would have done so in plain and
unequivocal language, which admittedly it did not do.22 The other circuits held
that the net effect of section 44 is to give U.S. nationals and citizens reciprocal
rights against foreign nationals when foreign nationals compete unfairly with
them.23
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit retreated from,24 and in the 1981 Toho case
finally repudiated, its view that section 44 created an independent basis for

17. Derenberg, supra note 3, at 1029.
18. Lanham Act § 44, 15 U.S.C § 1126 (1994).
19. 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
20. Id. Accord Neal v. Thomas Organ Co., 325 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1963); Pagliero v. Wallace China
Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). Two early California federal district court decisions refused to follow
the Stauffer v. Exley rule: Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, (S.D.
Cal.), affd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1956); Panaview Door & Window Co. v. Van Ness, 124 F. Supp. 329
(S.D. Cal. 1954). However, later California federal district court decisions recognized that Stauffer v.
Exley was the law, albeit only in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Magna Pictures Corp. v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 265 F. Supp. 144 (S.D. Cal. 1967); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 256
F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Cal. 1966), affd, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1966), supplemental op., 413 F.2d 1126 (1969).
21. Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971); Iowa
Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Co-op. Union, 247 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1957); Royal Lace Paper
Works, Inc. v. Pest-Guard Products, Inc., 240 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1957); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana
Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954); American Auto. Assn. v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1953).
22. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir.
1981)("[I]t would have been anomalous for Congress to enact an entire statute, 45 sections in length,
to define and protect trademarks by federal law and then in a passing reference to enact as federal the
entire common law of unregistered marks and unfair competition.").
23. See, e.g., L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 652 (3d Cir. 1954) (ruling
that § 44 gives "[U.S.] citizens reciprocal rights against foreign nationals where foreign nationals
compete unfairly with them. It does not aim to create a federal law of unfair competition available to
[U.S.] citizens one against the other nor does it grant the federal courts any new authority to hear such
controversies between citizens."). See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 175 U.S.P.Q.
563 (N.D. Tex. 1972), modified, 492 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1974) (Under Lanham Act §§ 44(b) and 44(h),
Volkswagenwerk A.G., a national of the German Federal Republic, may invoke a U.S. federal court's
jurisdiction to assert claims of unfair competition).
24. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
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federal jurisdiction." The court reinterpreted its prior decisions as involving
only an application of Lanham Act section 43(a), not section 44. The court
concluded that the doctrine of Stauffer v. Exley was "nugatory in suits between
The Ninth Circuit held that section 44 has a relatively
[U.S.] citizens.
narrow application: If a plaintiff is a national of a country that has a trademark
a federal claim coextensive
treaty with the United States, section 44(h) creates
27
treaty.
that
of
provisions
with the substantive
Thus, the Toho decision ended the last remnant of Edward S. Rogers's
dream of a private federal right of action against all kinds of "unfair competition." But the Toho decision caused hardly a ripple in the world of intellectual
property law, because by then all eyes were focused on section 43(a). Section
43(a), not section 44, had become the center of attention for the assertion of
federal claims for many types of unfair competition.
III
THE INHERENT LIMITS OF SECTION 43(a)

Section 43(a) can never be a federal "codification" of the overall law of
"unfair competition" because of its inherently limited wording. Advocates of
expanded federal law dreamed that section 44 could accomplish this goal28
because of its expansive language of "protection against unfair competition."
But even the most expansive language of section 43(a) is limited to a prohibition against some form of false designation or misleading representation. Such
a prohibition is quite a bit narrower in scope than the whole genus of "unfair
competition" law. 29 For example, section 43(a) does not cover acts of alleged
trade secret infringement, 30 bait-and-switch selling tactics, 31 or trademark

25. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 792 n.4.
27. Id. at 792 (holding that the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship requires only that Japanese
companies be treated in the United States courts as favorably as domestic companies, thus giving a

Japanese company a federal forum to pursue state law claims); see Majorica, S.A. v. Majorica Int'l, Ltd.,
687 F. Supp. 92, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (The Toho case stands for the rule that under § 44, a foreign
plaintiff "may invoke the Paris Convention together with the Lanham Act to assert a federal claim of
unfair competition[,1" but a U.S. court cannot apply the substantive law of a foreign nation to acts
committed in the United States.).
28. Lanham Act § 44(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (1994).
29. See Derenberg, supra note 3, at 1039 ("[§ 43(a)] was never intended to be a catch-all for all
forms of unfair competition ...." Prof. Derenberg concluded that §43(a) did not cover "trade

disparagement, commercial bribery and betrayal of trade secrets.").
30. Potucek v. Taylor, 738 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (ruling that § 43(a) does not provide
federal jurisdiction for claims of taking proprietary technical information or trade secrets).
31. Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., 858 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1988) (ruling that if "bait-and-

switch" tactics do not involve falsity, then § 43(a) does not cover the claim, because an insistent
customer could resist the sales pressure to "switch" and buy the advertised "bait" product).
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dilution.32 Thus, there is no federal statutory or common law of general unfair
competition.33
The 1987 Trademark Review Commission rejected the proposal that
Congress should federally codify the whole body of unfair competition law. The
Commission did not propose such a change, and it was never made part of the
1989 revisions to the Lanham Act.34
Section 43(a) is less encompassing than the general "unfair competition"
prohibitions of some state statutes 35 and of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 36 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed, section
43(a) "does not have boundless application as a remedy for unfair trade
practices . . . ., Similarly, the Ninth Circuit noted that section 43(a) "does
not prohibit a broad range of acts defined as unfair competition by the law of
many states., 38 Statements in some cases to the effect that section 43(a)
represents "an affirmative code of business ethics" 39 should be taken as judicial
hyperbole.
IV
THE GROWING YEARS: SECTION 43(a) MATURES AND GAINS STRENGTH
By the time section 43(a) was about twenty-five years old, it became obvious
that it was rapidly becoming established as the primary source of private
remedies against several important types of unfair competition. Gradually,
through case law interpretation and in sometimes erratic spurts of growth,
section 43(a) began to fulfill the role as the premier federal statute protecting

32. R. G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1979) (ruling that § 43(a)
does not incorporate the "anti-dilution" theory of state statutes).
33. Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhere is no federal
common law of unfair competition. . . . [There is no federal statute] which provides broadly for
protection against unfair competition."). The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) is only a jurisdictional
grant to the federal courts and does not create any substantive rights. The court observed that § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act provides narrower grounds for relief. While proposed and debated for many years,
no comprehensive federal unfair competition statute has ever been enacted. Idt Accord Monoflo Int'l,
Inc. v. Sahm, 726 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Va. 1989) (ruling that there is no federal common law of unfair
competition apart from the statutory provisions of Lanham Act §43(a)).
34. The United States Trademark Association ("USTA"), Trademark Review Commission, Report
and Recommendations to USTA Presidentand Board of Directors,77 TRADEMARK REP. 375,435 (1987)
[hereinafter Report of the Trademark Review Commission], reprintedin USTA, THE TRADEMARK LAW
REVISION Acr OF 1988 75 (1989) ("We also omitted a cause of action based simply on 'unfair
competition,' believing that it would have been entirely too broad and unworkable.").
35. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203 (West Supp. 1996); Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972) (ruling that collection agency that consistently filed debt collection
lawsuits in counties of improper venue was engaged in "unfair competition").
36. FTC Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C.S. § 45 (Law Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1 1996) ("unfair methods of
competition ... and unfair acts or practices").
37. Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
39. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub. nom S. C. Johnson &
Sons v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (ruling that this broad statement, sometimes
quoted out of context, is limited to the context of "within this area," meaning falsely descriptive
trademarks).
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against not only false advertising but also infringement of unregistered marks
and trade dress.
During the process of federal expansion of the scope of section 43(a), some
commentators argued for an even greater scope of coverage,' while others
argued that the courts had gone too far.41 By 1989, a whole book was devoted
to section 43(a) alone.4 2 Section 43(a) had achieved celebrity status.
In 1956, Judge Clark of the Second Circuit remarked of section 43(a) that
43
"the bar has not yet realized the potential impact of this statutory provision.
The Second Circuit later construed Judge Clark's statement to refer to the
federal courts' reluctance at that time to broaden the substantive scope of
section 43(a). 44 In 1964, the Harvard Law Review blamed the then-existing
"general paucity of litigation under section 43(a)" on the "general unawareness
45
of the potential breadth of the section.3
With the benefit of hindsight provided by the explosion of section 43(a)
litigation in the 1970s and 1980s, comments made in the 1950s and 1960s about
the non-use of section 43(a) now seem quaint. Plaintiffs' attorneys saw the
potential of section 43(a) and began pushing the courts to apply it to more and
different types of false advertising and unregistered trademark infringement.
The federal judiciary generally, but not unanimously, responded enthusiastically.
By the 1980s, section 43(a) had become a much-used and potent statute.46
And effective in 1989, Congress put its stamp of approval on this trend of
expansion by rewriting section 43(a) to codify the broadened scope of the
section.
While its language prevented it from ever becoming a federal statute giving
a private claim against all varieties of "unfair competition," section 43(a)
gradually developed through judicial construction into the foremost federal
vehicle for the assertion of two major and distinct types of "unfair competition":
(1) infringement of unregistered marks, names, and trade dress, and (2) "false
advertising."
These two "prongs" of section 43(a) developed somewhat
separately and have achieved their own sub-set of substantive rules.
Prior to congressional amendment of section 43(a) in 1989, both prongs
arose out of the prohibitions against "false designation of origin" and "false
description or representation." Those words did double duty in covering both

40. Joseph P. Bauer, A FederalLaw of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1984) (arguing for an expanded scope for § 43(a)).
41. Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come
a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973), reprintedin 64 TRADEMARK REP. 193,
194 (1974) ("It is submitted that the cases have applied [§] 43(a) to situations it was not intended to
cover and have used it in ways that it was not designed to function."); see Julius Lunsford, Protection
from False and Misleading Advertising, 35 FED. BAR J. 87 (1976) (offering a response).
42. MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 6.
43. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
44. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971).
45. Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 908 (1964).
46. See Bauer, supra note 40; Bruce N. Proctor, Distinctiveand Unusual Marketing Techniques: Are
They Protectable Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 4 (1987).
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classic false advertising as to the qualities of defendant's goods or services as
well as use of a mark that infringes a senior user's mark, name, or trade dress.
In its 1987 report, which led directly to the 1989 revision of the Lanham Act,
the Trademark Revision Commission noted with approval the way in which the
federal courts took the language of section 43(a) and expanded it:
Section 43(a) is an enigma, but a very popular one. Narrowly drawn and intended to
reach false designations or representations as to the geographical origin or products,
the section has been widely interpreted to create, in essence, a federal law of unfair
competition ....It has definitely eliminated a gap in unfair competition law and its
vitality is showing no signs of age.47

By its legislative rewriting of section 43(a), effective in 1989, Congress
codified the two prongs by separating them in the statute and numbering them
in what is now section 43(a) subsections (1)(A) and (1)(B).
V
THE

1989 CODIFICATION:

CONGRESS ACQUIESCES IN THE NEW ROLE OF SECTION

43(a)

Effective in 1989, section 43(a) was substantially rewritten, in large part to
codify the case law interpretation of the previous version of section 43(a), but
also to extend it to cover product disparagement.48
The 1989 revision replaced the by then archaic 1946 language with wording
that reflected the reality of case law interpretation. The Senate Report on the
legislation made it clear that the existing case law interpretation of the older
version of section 43(a) was codified by the new statutory language.49 Justice
Stevens in the Taco Cabana case agreed that in the 1989 revisions, "Congress
codified the judicial interpretation of section 43(a), giving its imprimatur to a
growing body of case law from the Circuits that had expanded the section
beyond its original language."5 °
The 1989 revision divided section 43(a) into two distinct sub-sections: the
first part relating to use of the statute as a vehicle for assertion in federal court
of unregistered trademark, service mark, trade name, and trade dress
infringement claims, and the second part relating to use of the statute as a
vehicle for assertion in federal court of false advertising (as well as product

47. Report of the Trademark Review Commission, supra note 34, at 426.
48. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov. 16,
1989).
49. Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S.1883, S.REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (Sept. 15, 1988)
("Section 35 [of the Bill] revises [§]43(a) of the Act to codify the interpretation it has been given by
the courts. Because [§] 43(a) of the Act fills an important gap in federal unfair competition law, the
committee expects the courts to continue to interpret the section.").
50. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 783 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). Accord
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that, since
congressional intent was to largely codify existing federal case law, "our precedents predating the new
language remain in force"); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 964 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Justice Thomas, while on the D.C. Court of Appeals, observed that "Congress intended that the
section 43(a) amendments largely codify pre-1988 case law.").
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disparagement) claims. The 1989 revision thus codified the "two prongs"
characterization of the case law.
The 1989 revision also codified the nearly unanimous rule of the cases5
that the Lanham Act statutory remedies for infringement of registered marks
also apply to violations of section 43(a). Thus all of the statutory remedies
available to the owner of a registered mark are now equally available to the
plaintiff who uses section 43(a) as the vehicle to assert claims of infringement
of unregistered marks, trade names, or trade dress, as well to assert claims of
false advertising and product disparagement.52
Case law interpreted the previous version of section 43(a) as not including
the tort of product disparagement: false factual claims made about the goods
or services of others. 3 The 1989 version "federalized" the previously
exclusively common law tort of product disparagement. That is, section 43(a)
was extended from a prohibition on false representations about the defendant's
own goods and services, to also prohibit certain false representations about the
plaintiff's goods and services.14 In informal House-Senate negotiations, a
House-sponsored provision for consumer standing to sue under section 43(a)
was deleted.5
Two provisions contained in earlier proposals for section 43(a) were deleted
in Congress. The Senate deleted language providing (1) that misrepresentations
based on omissions of material fact are actionable, (2) a separate claim for
trademark tarnishment and disparagement, and (3) a section 43(c) creating a
federal anti-dilution claim.56 A federal anti-dilution claim was re-introduced
years later and enacted into law in 1996.1'
VI
THE FALSE ADVERTISING PRONG OF SECTION 43(a)

A. Early Narrow Interpretation Gives Way to Sweeping Coverage
The classic pattern of "false advertising" is one competitor advertising that
her product has some quality which in fact it does not have, but which the
products of competitors do have. At common law, the primary obstacle to a
51. See cases cited at 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.05[1][b], at 27-60.
52. Senator DeConcini stated that it was the intent of Congress that the remedies of § 43(a) do not
preempt remedies otherwise available under the Lanham Act, state, or common law. 134 CONG. REC.
S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in USTA, THE TRADEMARK
LAW REVISION Acr OF 1988, supra note 34, at 334.
53. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.09[2], at 27-128.
54. See discussion infra at part IX (regarding product disparagement).
55. See Scott E. Thompson, Consumer Standing under Section 43(a): More Legislative History, More
Confusion, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 341 (1989).
56. S. JuD. REP. on S. 1883, at 41 (Sept. 15, 1988), reprinted in USTA, THE TRADEMARK LAW
REVISION ACT OF 1988, supra note 34, at 193.
57. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (signed by
the President on Jan. 16, 1996, and effective on that date); see 51 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) 336, 345 (Jan. 4, 1996) (containing text of statute).
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plaintiff proving a case for false representation was the requirement of proof of
some actual injury proximately caused by the defendant's alleged misrepresentation." If there are numerous sources in an open market, it will be impossible
to ascertain whether consumers would have dealt with a particular seller but for
the defendant's deceptive advertising.5 9 Thus, even in an open market with
many sellers where the defendant is engaged in false advertising, under the
common law view, a court would probably find that a plaintiff has no standing
to sue to prevent it. This is ironic, for even though a defrauded consumer
would have standing, the small amount of damage to each person means that
consumers would almost never sue for false advertising violations. Consumers
generally leave such policing to government agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission. Under the common law, the only time a competitor would have
standing to sue was if the competitor is the single source of the product that the
defendant is falsely advertising.'
The older, and minority, interpretation of section 43(a) was that it did not
eliminate the common law requirement that the plaintiff-competitor allege and
prove a direct loss of customers caused by the false advertising. 61 This view
held that section 43(a) was a mere codification of the common law "single
source" limitation on standing to sue for false advertising. It was early held, for
example, that if a plaintiff under section 43(a) was not the "single source" of a
misrepresented product, he had no standing to sue.62 Such decisions meant
that section 43(a) did little, if anything, to remedy the standing-to-sue obstacle
presented by the common law. Some other early decisions read the section
more narrowly, holding that section 43(a) did not cover false advertising
generally, but was probably limited to certain misrepresentations about the
goods themselves.63
58. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.01, at 27-5; Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts,
supra note 45, at 905.
59. See, e.g., Construction Tech., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 704 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding
no standing to sue for common law misrepresentation and false advertising on ground that plaintiff in
an open market comprised of several sellers cannot prove that buyers would have dealt with plaintiff
but for the alleged false advertising of defendant); Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp.
656 (D. Conn. 1984), affd, 748 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying damages on ground that plaintiff in
an open market composed of sellers other than plaintiff and defendant was unable to prove that but
for defendant's misrepresentation, the defendant's customers, or any provable percentage of them,
would have purchased from plaintiff instead); Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d
Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
60. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.01[4].
61. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951) ("In order to entitle
[plaintiffs] to the relief sought it would be necessary for them to allege that they have an exclusive right
to the use of the story in question and they must be injured directly by [defendant's] acts.").

62. Id (dismissing case for failure to state a claim). Chamberlainwas distinguished in U-Haul Int'l,
Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[Chamberlain],which has been criticized by
commentators, was essentially a 'palming off' case, and again did not specifically address the
applicability of section 43(a) to false advertising.").
63. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949), affd per
curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (dismissing claim that competitor falsely advertised that a clothing
store was supported by a labor union, falsely inducing union members to shop there, on the ground that
§ 43(a) is not a prohibition on false advertising generally). The court reasoned that § 43(a)
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Starting in the early 1960s, other courts began to reject the thinking of the
early "narrow interpretation" cases.' Courts adopted the view that section
43(a) creates a new, statutory federal tort, sui generis, which is limited only by
the words of the statute itself.65 The modern view is that the "single source"
requirement of common law false advertising is not applicable to Lanham Act
section 43(a), for the Act merely requires a showing that the plaintiff is "likely
to be damaged." In the leading L'Aiglon case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit emphasized the significant break with the common law that
section 43(a) now represented:
It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false representation
of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured or likely to be
injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal courts . . . . Perhaps this
statutory tort bears closest resemblance to the already noted tort of false advertising
to the detriment of a competitor . . . . But however similar to or different from
pre-existing law, here is a provision of a federal statute which, with clarity and
precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and defines rights and duties and
provides for their vindication in the federal courts. 66

As the Second Circuit stated in rejecting the common law "single source" rule
in a section 43(a) case,
the passage of section 43(a) represented a departure from the common law action for
trade disparagement and the need to prove actual damages as a prerequisite for
injunctive relief. This departure marked the creation of a new statutory tort intended
to secure a market-place free from deceitful marketing practices.67

Thus, section 43(a) became the favored legal tool for advertisers in a wide
range of industries who felt that a competitor was engaging in false advertising.68 For example, false advertising battles among the makers of over-the-

should not be interpreted so as to bring within its scope any kind of undesirable business
practice which involves deception, when such practices are outside the field of the trade-mark
laws.... The deceitful practices of which plaintiff here complains involve no false description
or representation of the goods themselves or false designation of origin.
Id. But see U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Samson Crane, albeit
influential for a number of years, is not persuasive. It has been criticized by a leading scholar
[Derenberg] ... ; its holding was only an alternative basis for the court's decision ... ; and its vitality
has been questioned in the very district and circuit in which it originated .... ").
The First Circuit, home of the 1949 Samson Crane decision declined in 1988 to reconsider the
validity of the rule, dismissing plaintiffs claim for failure of proof. The court said it would "postpone
its reconsideration for another day." Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F.2d 478,
491 (1st Cir. 1988)(Breyer, J.).
64. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Gilette Co., 408 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (N.D. I11.1976) ("The
Samson Crane case, however, is at best weak precedent."); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (disapproving of restrictive Samson Crane view).
65. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963); see Norman M.
Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou
Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (concluding that § 43(a) creates a "new federal
statutory tort, sui generis").
66. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954).
67. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 1980); see Black Hills
Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1980) (ruling that § 43(a) eliminates the
common law "single source" restriction).
68. See examples listed in 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.07[2][f].
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69 While the
counter pain relievers fill large portions of the case reporters.
usual remedy obtained is an injunction, occasionally large damage awards have
been recovered. One of the largest awards in any false advertising case was the
$40 million award in the 1986 U-Haul case in the Ninth Circuit. Finding the
defendant a "commercial privateer" engaged in "predatory" false comparative
advertising, the court awarded $20 million in damages and another $20 million
in increased and punitive damages, plus attorney fees.' °

B. Consumer Standing to Sue for False Advertising
The original language of section 43(a) literally provided anyone with a
federal claim if they believed they would be damaged by the use of any words
or other symbols that falsely described or misrepresented goods or services.
Thus, on its face, section 43(a) provides defrauded consumers, as well as injured
competitive business interests, the standing to sue. But by 1995, four federal
circuits had held that there is no consumer standing to sue for false advertising
under section 43(a).7 '
In the seminal Colligan case in 1971, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that early drafts of the Lanham Act contemplated suits by
consumers. However, the court held that the purpose of section 43(a) is
"exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against
unscrupulous conduct., 72 The court feared that opening the federal courts to
consumer actions under section 43(a) "would lead to a veritable flood of claims
brought in already overtaxed federal courts, while adequate private remedies for
consumer protection, which to date have been left almost exclusively to the
states, are readily at hand. '73 The Second Circuit felt that congressional silence
as to whether defrauded consumers had standing to invoke section 43(a) meant
that they did not have such standing.
In Congress in 1988, an attempt was made to give consumers standing. A
House version of the bill that eventually led to the Trademark Law Revision
Act and the revision of section 43(a) expressly contained language giving
69. See, e.g., American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y.),
later proceeding, 672 F. Supp. 135 (1987) (denying certification of an order dismissing counterclaim),
686 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.), reconsideration denied, 682 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting
injunctions but denying damages in both principal claim, finding Tylenol advertisements falsely claimed
various aspects of superiority over and comparability with aspirin and ibuprofen, and counterclaim,
finding Advil advertisements made false claims, including one that Advil brand ibuprofen is less
susceptible than acetaminophen to adverse drug interactions); McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home
Products Corp., 675 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (issuing preliminary injunction against use of
advertising claim "[hlike Tylenol, Advil doesn't give me minor stomach upset"), affd, 848 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1988).
70. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc. 601 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff d in part, modified in
part, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
71. Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d
Cir. 1993); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortg. Midwest Crop., 871 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1989); Colligan v.
Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971).
72. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 692.
73. Id. at 693.
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consumers the right to sue for a violation of section 43(a).74 But the provision
Representative
was deleted in a House-Senate conference committee.
Kastenmeier inserted a statement in the record to the effect that he believed
that consumers have standing under the case law and that the deleted consumer
standing proposal would only have "clarified that law."75 This must be
recognized as only an optimistic opinion by a representative whose proposal was
defeated in a House-Senate compromise.76
VII
THE TRADEMARK AND TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT PRONG
OF SECTION 43(A)

Section 43(a) was originally envisioned by Lanham Act sponsors as a federal

anti-false advertising statute. The phrase "false designation of origin" was
thought to be limited to false advertising of geographic origin.77 The first
expansion of the meaning of "origin" to include origin of source, sponsorship
or affiliation in the classic trademark sense, came in 1963. In that year, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that "origin" did not refer only to
geographic origin but also "to origin of source of manufacture."78 This
seemingly simple new spin put on the word "origin" raised the curtain on a
whole new chapter in federal unfair competition law. It heralded the beginning
of a new dimension of section 43(a) as a vehicle to assert in federal court a
traditional case of infringement of an unregistered mark, name, or trade dress.
Even prior to the 1989 rewriting and codification of section 43(a), the courts
nearly unanimously held that section 43(a) provided a federal vehicle for
assertion of infringement of even unregistered marks and names. 79 As the
Second Circuit remarked, section 43(a) "is the only provision in the Lanham
Act that protects an unregistered mark."8 0 In suing under section 43(a) for

74. See H.R. REP.No. 887 (I & II) (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577.
75. 134 CONG. REC. H10419 (daily ed. Oct. 19,1988) ("While I support the deletion as part of the
necessary compromise on this bill [S1883], it is unfortunate in the long run. I continue to believe that
consumers already have standing to sue under current law, and that the provision that was deleted only
clarified that law.").
76. See Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993) (agreeing with this author's view
as to the significance of Rep. Kastenmeier's statement).
77. RoBERT, supra note 7, at 186-88.
78. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963); see Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
79. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1988) (Lanham
Act § 43(a) "protects not only registered trademarks, but unregistered marks. . . as well."); New West
Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979) ("To recover for a violation of this
section[, it] is not necessary that a mark or trademark be registered."); Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano
Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1977) ("Thus, one who may suffer adverse consequences from a
violation of [§] 1125(a) has standing to sue regardless of whether he is the registrant of a trademark.").
80. Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir.
1987).
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infringement of an unregistered trademark, the plaintiff, unaided by the
81
presumptions of a registration, must prove both validity and infringement.
82
While this expansion of the word "source" was criticized as unwise, by the
early 1980s it had become a firmly embedded reality. Prior to the 1989
amendments, it made no difference whether such infringement cases fell under
the "false designation of origin" clause or the "false description or representation" clause (or both), since the result was the same: Section 43(a) was
triggered.83
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took a contrary view,
reaching the same result, but by a different statutory route. The court held that
the word "origin" in the pre-1989 version of section 43(a) was limited to
geographic origin, but that "false description or representation" of the
commercial (non-geographic) origin of a product was actionable under section
43(a): "the false representation that the goods being sold by the defendant are
produced or sold by the plaintiff."'
The Second Circuit observed that when section 43(a) is used to assert
infringement of an unregistered mark, "the claim is now frequently recognized,
with respect to unregistered marks, as the equivalent of a claim for trademark
infringement." When this is the case, a jury should not be confused by being
presented with two separate claims, one under section 43(a), the other for
infringement of a registered trademark.85
By the time of the Supreme Court's 1992 Taco Cabana decision, Justice
White could state of the original version of section 43(a) that "it is common
ground that [section] 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that
the general principles qualifying a mark for registration under [section] 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining 86whether an
unregistered mark is entitled to protection under [section] 43(a).,

81. Yarmuth-Dion, Inc. v. D'ion Furs, Inc., 835 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1987) (calling it a "two-step test"
for proof of infringement of unregistered marks under § 43(a): validity and infringement).
82. Germain, supra note 41.
83. See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291,296 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Federal courts have long
held that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends protection to unregistered trademarks on the principle that
unlicensed use of a designation serving the function of a registered mark constitutes a false designation
of origin and a false description or representation.").
84. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981) (Today,
this Fifth Circuit view is interesting but largely irrelevant, deserving merely this historical footnote.);
see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring: "Today, it
is less significant whether the infringement falls under 'false designation of origin' or 'false description
or representation' because in either case § 43(a) may be invoked.").
85. Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985).
86. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. Justice Stevens observed in his concurrence that the Supreme
Court viewed § 43(a) "as having created a federal cause of action for infringement of unregistered
trademark or trade dress and conclude[d] that such a mark or trade dress should receive essentially the
same protection as those that are registered." Id at 776.
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Section 43(a) has proven particularly useful to attain federal jurisdiction in
cases involving false representations and infringement of unregistered marks and
symbols used in the literary, entertainment, and sports industries. 7
VIII
SECTION

43(a) AND THE RISE OF TRADE DRESS PROTECTION

A. What is "Trade Dress"?
Trade dress is the totality of elements in which a product or service is
packaged, presented, or designed. 8 These elements combine to create the
whole visual image presented to customers and are capable of acquiring
exclusive legal rights as a type of identifying symbol of origin. Usually, trade
dress is alleged to consist of the distinctive appearance of the configuration of
the product or its package.
However, like a word asserted to be a trademark, the elements making up
the alleged trade dress must have been used in such a manner as to denote
product source.8 9

When the intent of the designer and the impact on the

shopper is purely aesthetic, the design does not meet the fundamental
requirement that it serve to identify and distinguish a source.'
B. Section 43(a) Avoids the Sears-Compco Preemption Problem
In 1964, the Supreme Court in the Sears-Compco cases sounded what many
thought was the death knell of American trade dress law.91 Trade dress was
previously protected largely under state common law. At common law, product
and package configurations, to be protected against unfair imitation, had to
meet three basic criteria: (1) non-functionality; (2) proof of secondary meaning;

87. See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 507

(D.N.J. 1986) (while federal registration of a team name for entertainment services is not infringed by
use on wearing apparel, team's § 43(a) rights flowing from its licensed wearing apparel is infringed by

unauthorized use of "New Jersey Giants"); Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675
F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982) (distinctive elements of television series); Harlequin Enter., Ltd. v. Gulf &
Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981) (book cover trade dress); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602
(9th Cir. 1981) (replacing actor's name in film credits); Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14

(2d Cir. 1976) (unpermitted editing of television program); see also discussion in 3 MCCARTHY, supra
note 12, § 27.08[2].
88. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 8.01[1][a], at 8-2.
89. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1441 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[O]ne cannot automatically conclude from a product feature or configuration-as one can from a
product's arbitrary name, for example-that, to a consumer, it functions primarily to denote the
product's source.").
90. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995) (rulling that plaintiff failed
to prove that an autumn squirrel and leaf design on sweater was an indicator of source: "[S]ince the
primary purpose of [plaintiff's] sweater designs is aesthetic rather than source-identifying, [Plaintiff's]
sweater designs do not meet the first requirement of an action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act-that
they be used as a mark to identify or distinguish source").
91. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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and (3) likelihood of confusion.92 But in 1964, the Supreme Court held that
state trade dress law could not be used for product configuration because it was
largely preempted by federal patent law: "Just as a [s]tate cannot encroach
upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as
that forbidding unfair competition, give protection
of a kind that clashes with
93
the objective of the federal patent laws.,
The Supreme Court later retreated from the sweeping and expansive pro-

federal rights views of Sears-Compco,94 but by then most attorneys looking for

exclusive rights for trade dress had abandoned state law and were using section
43(a) as the vehicle for assertion of trade dress infringement. Grounding the
claim on a federal statute avoids the federal-state preemption rationale of
Sears-Compco. The Second Circuit took this view:
It is surely true that in the Sears and Compco opinions the Supreme Court said
nothing about the federal tort created by [section] 43(a) .... The Court, it can be
strongly argued, had no need to be concerned with marking out the boundaries of a
federal tort over which it had complete control and which Congress could contract if
the courts were pressing it further than that body desired.'

The Third Circuit agreed, stating that a "suit brought under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act survives the stringent limitations on state unfair competition
laws imposed by the decisions of the Supreme Court [in Sears-Compco]."96 In

the Compco decision, the Supreme Court observed that, "if the design is not
entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be
copied at will." 97 Thus, section 43(a) qualifies as "federal statutory protection"
under this exception to the Sears-Compco policy. 98 And the Seventh Circuit

cleared the decks of any lingering constitutional objections when it expressly
rejected the argument that federal trade dress protection under section 43(a) for

92. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 158 (1989) ("[T]he common law
tort of unfair competition has been limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of
consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a designation of
source . . . The 'protection' granted a particular design under the law of unfair competition is thus
limited to one context where consumer confusion is likely to result: the design 'idea' itself may be freely
exploited in all other contexts."); see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 7.23[1I, at 7-93.
93. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231.
94. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (rejecting a broad reading of Sears-Compco that would mean that
states cannot give "any form of protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad scope of
patentable subject matter").
95. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir. 1979), on remand, 488 F. Supp.
394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 844 (1982), affid without op.,
697 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1982). Accord Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
1976).
96. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981). Accord Versa Prod.
Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204 n.13 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the Supremacy Clause does not,
as in Sears-Compco, bar Lanham Act § 43(a) from protecting product configuration trade dress).
97. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (emphasis added).
98. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Of course, the Lanham Act falls
under the rubric of 'other federal statutory protection,' and courts have expressly held that Sears and
Compco do not preclude federal trademark protection of designs."); Ferrari s.p.a. Esercizio Fabriche
Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Thus, [defendant] cannot copy
because 'other federal protection,' the Lanham Act, applies.").
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product configuration unconstitutionally conflicts with the Patent Clause of the
Constitution.99
C. "Trade Dress" Encompasses Product Shape and Design
While "trade dress" traditionally meant only the packaging and labeling of
a product, as a result of section 43(a) litigation in the 1980s, the term has now
been stretched to include the shape and design of the product itself." Thus,
the field of law once referred to as "unfair competition by product simulation"
has now been folded into that corner of trademark and unfair competition law
called "trade dress."
Dating the beginning of this change in classification to a decision in
1983,1"1 Professor J. H. Reichman remarked that such decisions "began to
stretch the notion of trade dress to the point where prior distinctions between
"package" or "container" and "product configuration" became blurred and
hardly worth defending."'" Soon, section 43(a) became the vehicle for
assertion of alleged trade dress in a wide range of products as well as their
packaging and containers. When asserted under section 43(a), "trade dress"
soon became an expansive concept and has been held to include such things as:
the cover of a book 0 3 or a magazine;1°4 the appearance of a teddy bear
toy;" the look of a Rubik's Cube puzzle; 1°6 the shape of a classic automo-

99. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
100. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[Tirade dress protection extends beyond a product's packaging or labeling to include 'the appearance
of the [product] itself."'); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (design of
lightweight nylon luggage protected as trade dress); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Corp., 685 F.2d
78, 80 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Although historically trade dress infringement consisted of copying a
product's packaging, the parties and the district court used the term 'trade dress' in its more modem
sense to refer to the appearance of the Rubik's Cube itself as well as its packaging, and we will do the
same.").

101. Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983) (protecting as trade dress a folder
used to display samples of carpeting fabrics: an article that was both a package and a product).
102. J. H. Reichman, Design Protectionand the New Technologies: The United States Experience in
a TransnationalPerspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REv. 6, 87 (1990).
103. Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (no infringement of
alleged trade dress in cover of dictionary); Harlequin Enterprises, Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644
F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981) (book cover protected); Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F.
Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (reasoning that a rule that copyrightable book covers could not obtain trade
dress protection would be incongruous).
104. Time, Inc. v. Globe Communications Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that the
similar overall cover format, especially the "virtually indistinguishable" logos of plaintiff People
magazine and defendant Celebrity magazine, justify a preliminary injunction against trade dress
infringement); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
the overall layout and design of Reader's Digest magazine to be protected as both trade dress and
copyright and finding both rights infringed).
105. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
106. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 78 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982).
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bile;"° the overall design of a sports shoe;' the appearance of a video game
console;1°9 the appearance of a water meter;110 a combination of features112of
a folding table;... and the interior and exterior appearance of a restaurant.
Trade dress protection has even been stretched to include protection of the
overall "look" of a line of greeting cards. Individual features making up the
"look" included such common items as a two-fold card, deckle edge, lengthy
poetry, and air brush colors. In that case, the court reasoned that "the arbitrary
selection and combination of greeting card features may constitute protected
trade dress even though the features serve useful 1 13purposes in conveying
messages and invoking certain emotions and feelings.
D. Indefinite Rights and the Uncertain Injunction
While trade dress may consist of the totality of elements making up the
product or its packaging and presentation, in the author's view, it should not be
sufficient solely to identify in litigation such a totality as "the trade dress."
Rather, the individual elements that make up that totality need to be separated
out and individually described. Only then can the court and the parties
coherently define exactly what the trade dress includes, determine whether that
trade dress is valid, and if the accused infringes on the trade dress. For
example, in the famous Taco Cabana case, while the appellate courts only
generally described the restaurant trade dress, the district court in framing the
that were required to be changed to avoid
injunction listed the elements 114
infringement of the trade dress.
107. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili e Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding the overall design of the Ferrari Daytona Spyder classic sports car protectable trade dress
under § 43(a) and enjoining defendant from the sale of replica autos).
108. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 215 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (but finding that
conspicuous placement of word marks on defendant's look-alike shoes prevented consumer confusion).
109. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding defendant's copied video
game console, art work, and mark to be trade dress infringement under §43(a)).
110. Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1507 (7th Cir. 1994).
111. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987).
112. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R.
Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
113. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1539 (D. Colo. 1986), affd,
846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988); see Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989)
(protecting as trade dress the overall combination of individually "common, indistinct elements" making
up a line of greeting cards and affirming a $4.3 million award: "Trade dress encompasses the overall
appearance of a product, including its size, color or color combination, texture, graphics, packaging or
other visual features.").
114. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992). The Court generally
defined the "trade dress" as
[a] festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts,
bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas with the
interior patio capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage doors.
The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint
and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Id. In 1988, the court issued an injunction as to all Two Peso's restaurants in operation at that time,
requiring Defendant to do the following: (1) make all roof elevations of the same height by eliminating
the "step-down" effect between the two silhouette structures making up the building as well as the
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In some cases, neither the plaintiff nor the court defines exactly what the
trade dress consists of except for vague and indeterminate references to the
"overall appearance" or "look" of plaintiff's product or packaging, with an
injunction vaguely prohibiting defendant from "infringing" on that "trade
'
dress."115
This may well leave the defendant uncertain as to what to do to
avoid a charge of contempt and creates dangers of anti-competitive over-protection.116 Such imprecision and ambiguity is unfair to the party accused of
infringement who is forced to defend against an amorphous claim of exclusivity
that may be of uncertain and indeterminate dimensions. The danger is that the
law of trade dress under section 43(a) may be used as an anti-competitive
weapon when based upon an indeterminate and nebulous claim of "trade dress"
infringement.
E. Section 43(a) Trade Dress Protection Expands Exponentially: Common
Law Patents and Copyrights?
Since the Taco Cabana case, critics argue that the scope of "trade dress"
protection under section 43(a) has been expanded by the federal courts to cover
cases where there is no federal copyright or patent protection for such a feature.
The danger is that a marginal "trade dress" claim leading to an injunction
against imitation can be a loose cannon on the decks of the good ship "Free

Competition." That is, an expansive scope of "trade dress" protection creates
the danger of obstructing the free flow of competition by the creation of a series
of new common law copyrights and patents." 7

Legally protected zones of exclusive rights, such as patents, trademarks, and
copyrights, are exceptions to the general principle of free copying and imitation.
The Supreme Court in several decisions has made it clear that it sees the

drive-through roof line; (2) eliminate stripes around the top of the building and to use only white neon
if any is used; (3) change to a solid color awning; (4) install at least three false or painted windows on
exterior side walls; and (5) paint front face of the pick-up counter and both sides of the wall between
interior dining and patio areas white or a gray/green color. Three additional changes were required for
future restaurants. Taco Cabana Int'l., Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., C.A. No. H-87-0026 (S.D. Tex, Houston
Div., Order of Dec. 30, 1988).
115. See, e.g., Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd and
modified on other grounds, 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reasoning that it is appropriate to use photos
of plaintiffs furniture design trade dress rather than words in the injunction because "mere words"
cannot adequately describe "the total image" of the product); Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc. v.
Contico Int'l, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Va. 1993) (defining the "overall appearance, shape[,] and
proportion" of a square plastic container as protectable trade dress and issuing a preliminary injunction
enjoining defendant from making or selling "any products that infringe the trade dress").
116. An injunction that orders a defendant not to "infringe plaintiff's trade dress" or not to sell
something that is "confusingly similar" to plaintiff's undefined "trade dress" may be so ambiguous and
vague as to be fatally imprecise. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 30.08, at 30-24.
117. While I use the term "common law" for rhetorical purposes, I recognize that all of these trade
dress cases do arise under a statute-Lanham Act § 43(a). But injunctions founded on such claims
effectively create exclusive rights that have never been examined in a patent-like fashion by the Patent
and Trademark Office and that sometimes appear to violate the basic rule that no one can obtain a
copyright on any idea, procedure, or process. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Hence the term "common
law patents and copyrights."
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ultimate goal of the Constitution and the patent, trademark, and copyright
statutes as putting things into the public domain."8 While this is not the
perspective most intellectual property attorneys have in the daily practice of the
law, it is the fact that free usage, not exclusive rights, is the ultimate policy of
the intellectual property laws.119
Some recent decisions take trade dress protection to a new and expansive
scope of protection. For example, one court issued an injunction against the
sale of an artist's posters because they imitated the "trade dress" style of the
plaintiff's paintings."2 Any student of art history knows that no copyright law
has ever given exclusive rights to an artist's mere "style." How is it appropriate
for a court to use trade dress law to create such visual style rights where
copyright law wisely does not? In another example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against the use of
aspects of the business of providing computerized promotion and advertising for
auto dealerships and repair shops. One aspect found to be part of the trade
dress was the layout of a reminder letter to car owners to alert them to the need
for servicing. The format and layout of the letter was said to be "inherently
distinctive" trade dress and the junior user's letter an infringing "slavish
imitation." '' Since copyright law does not protect any "system, method of
operation[, or] concept," '22 is it appropriate for trade dress law to fill the gap
by giving exclusive rights in the style of formatting a business letter?
The design and appearance of some fairly routine and mundane objects have
received marketplace exclusivity under section 43(a) trade dress law. Judicial
distaste for competitive imitation appears to often turn the scales in a case. In
1993, a federal court in Virginia issued a preliminary injunction barring the
defendant from producing a trash receptacle that imitated the appearance of

118. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) ("[F]ree
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.
Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure .... ); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (referring to
"the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in
reality a part of the public domain"); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938)
("Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right
possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.").
119. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 1.15[2]-[3].
120. Romm Art Creations, Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting
injunction against the sale of posters and limited edition prints by an artist on ground they too closely
copied the "style" of the plaintiff artist where "overall look" of works was held to be inherently
distinctive trade dress and hence not in need of proof of secondary meaning; defendant was said to have
imitated artist Itschak Tarkay's "women and cafes" series, impressionistic portrayals of women relaxing
and conversing in coffee shops).
121. Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enter., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting plaintiff
exclusive rights in combination of protectable elements of reminder letter: white paper, right-angled
blue stripe, dealer's specials listed in the horizontal part of the blue stripe, a manufacturer's logo, blue
color of the logo, dealer's phone number appearing twice in the letter, the sign-off bearing a first name,
the typeface, size of the paper, and use of a window envelope).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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plaintiff Rubbermaid's "square brute" trash receptacle."2 This was a square,
sturdy plastic receptacle made in various sizes with a lid and handles. While the
defendant's designer denied conscious imitation, the court disagreed, holding
that the close similarity of the two square containers proved copying. In
addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said that copying
creates a presumption of intent to confuse, which in turn creates a presumption
of a likelihood of confusion of customers.
However, at almost the same time, another district court in the Fourth
Circuit denied a preliminary injunction against copying the design of a line of
furniture. This court's opinion began the analysis with the statement that "free
copying remains the rule." It said that to award a preliminary injunction here
"would, in effect, award a furniture manufacturer with the equivalent of a
design patent."' 24 The court said that the problem with the Fourth Circuit's
presumption of secondary meaning triggered by copying is that it rests on the
assumption that no one copies except to poach unfairly on a protectable
trademark or trade dress. The court found the presumption of secondary
meaning was rebutted here, in part by evidence of the plaintiff's advertising that
focused on the functional and decorative aspects of the design rather than on
linking the appearance with a single source."
Why is trade dress law being used to create exclusive rights in configurations
that traditionally were the domain of patent or copyright law? In the author's
opinion, these judges are unduly influenced by the fact that the defendant in
these cases has copied something. The view seems to be that "copying" per se
is both morally and legally wrong. The courts will sometimes take evidence of
copying and use it as a surrogate for proof of both secondary meaning and of
a likelihood of confusion. Under the majority view, evidence of copying is
probative, but not determinative, of secondary meaning. 26 Further, copying
is sometimes inferred from evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the senior
user's product combined with similarities between the packaging or products of
the parties.1" Similarly, the majority rule is that intent to confuse can be
inferred from evidence of copying. In turn, an intent to confuse creates a

123. Rubbermaid Commercial Prod., Inc. v. Contico Int'l, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Va. 1993)
(enjoining defendant under § 43(a) injunction from "infringing the trade dress" and design patent on
plaintiff's container).
124. Devan Designs, Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991, 1995, 1999 (M.D.N.C.
1992), affd, 998 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1993).
125. Id. at 1997 ("When advertisements promote the functional and decorative features of a product
without promoting an association between goods and producer, it is not helpful in establishing
secondary meaning.").
126. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 15.12[2], at 15-56; see, e.g., Rubbermaid v. Contico, 836 F. Supp.
1247, 1261 (W.D. Va. 1993) ("At the very least, the fact that [defendant] appropriated the key features
of [plaintiff's] trade dress indicates that [defendant] felt there was consumer recognition of the [product]
on which [defendant] could trade.").
127. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23.33[4], at 23-212; see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor
Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1991) (reasoning that, when the marks are almost identical, "[t]his
fact alone gives rise to a strong inference of confusion").
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presumption of a likelihood of confusion of customers.' 28 These presumptions
and inferences may sometimes lead to the result that a court can infer copying
just from close similarity of the parties' products or packages.
Where do all these presumptions and inferences leave us on a motion for
preliminary injunction? It may sometimes mean that a preliminary injunction
preventing the defendant from selling its product may be based on little more
than a close resemblance in product appearance. Copying is evidence from
which the court can infer that there is a valid trade dress (via secondary
meaning) and that it is infringed because customer confusion is likely.
E

Should Trade Dress Status be Presumed? What is "Inherently
Distinctive" Trade Dress?
In 1992, the Supreme Court in the Taco Cabana case resolved a split of
authority in the courts of appeal and held that trade dress that is "inherently
distinctive" is protectable under section 43(a) without a showing that it has
acquired consumer association in the form of a secondary meaning.129 One
difficulty with the Supreme Court decision is that it nowhere indicates how one
goes about determining whether trade dress is or is not "inherently distinctive."
Some decisions prior to Taco Cabana held that one must ask whether the
design, shape, or combination of elements is so unique, unusual, or unexpected
in this market that one can assume without proof that it will automatically be
perceived by customers as an indicia of origin-that is, as a kind of trademark
for the product.1" A few courts have tried to apply to trade dress the
traditional spectrum of trademarks. These are categories that were created for
word marks. Thus, such courts have tried to apply such word-meaning
categories as "arbitrary," "suggestive," and "descriptive" to shapes and
images. 13 But, as the Third Circuit noted, the spectrum of distinctiveness
created for words does not fit the very different situation of packaging and

128. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23.34[3], at 23-221 to 23-222; see, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki
Importers & Dists., Inc., 996 F.2d 577,586 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Where a second-comer acts in bad faith and
intentionally copies a trademark or trade dress, a presumption arises that the copier has succeeded in
causing confusion."); Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127,1136 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[Bly intentionally imitating the plaintiff's Ultrasuede mark and trade dress, defendants implicitly
stated that they believed that they could create a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the
source of their product and that they could profit thereby. Accordingly ....
we should take them at
their word.").
129. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
130. See, e.g., Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977);
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 8.02[4] (citing cases that rely on the Seabrook test).
131. See, e.g., Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that a
spectrum of distinctiveness developed for words should be applied to trade dress); Paddington Corp.
v. Attiki Importers & Dists., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that ouzo bottle was

inherently distinctive because, inter alia,"[tihere is nothing descriptive about the bottle and label design
that conveys anything about its particular contents"); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) ("If the features of the trade dress sought to be

protected are arbitrary and serve no function either to describe the product or assist in its effective
packaging," then it is inherently distinctive.).
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product shapes: "[W]e do not think it helpful or proper to transplant the
categorical distinctiveness inquiry developed for trademarks to product
132
configurations, where the alleged trade dress lies in the very product itself.
It is erroneous to find a product or packaging feature to be "inherently
distinctive" merely because it is not identical to features already to be found in
the marketplace. 133 A product or package feature is not inherently distinctive
merely because there is no other product on the market that looks exactly the
It would, in the author's opinion, be anti-competitive to dub as
same."
"inherently distinctive" product or package features that differ only slightly from
those commonly encountered by customers in the marketplace.
Some courts and commentators 135 draw a line between product shapes and
other trade dress formats such that product shape is never inherently distinctive
(and hence always requires proof of secondary meaning) while other formats
such as packaging could be.
The Third Circuit has read Two Pesos to mean that while trade dress in the
configuration of a product could, in some cases, be classified as inherently
distinctive, a more demanding standard of inherent distinctness could and should
be applied to product shape. 13 6 Laying down a very rigorous test, the court

132. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1994); see Vincent
N. Palladino, Trade Dress After Two Pesos, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 408, 415 (1994) ("[T]he spectrum of
distinctiveness has so far not proved to be very useful in reaching a reasoned decision regarding trade
dress."). Agreeing with the Duraco test, the Second Circuit retreated from its previous application of
the word-mark spectrum to categorize all trade dress shapes. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d
996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995) (The word-mark spectrum of distinctiveness "makes little sense when applied
to product features.").
133. Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d 1431.
134. In re F.C.F., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1825 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (ruling that a picture of roses, while not
identical to previous rose pictures, is not used as a trademark for cosmetics when used in a purely
ornamental and decorative way to cover most of the surface of containers for the product.); In re E.S.
Robbins Corp., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (Floor mat for use under chair, while not identical
to other mats, differs only slightly in shape. Thus is it not "inherently distinctive" because it does not
have an "original, distinctive and peculiar appearance."); Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781
1991) ("Presumably, it could be said about the trade dress of any new
F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (N.D. Ill.
product that no competitive product combines precisely the same elements in its trade dress .
However, that fact alone does not make the product's trade dress inherently distinctive.").
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (1995). The Restatement
provides that
product designs are more likely to be seen merely as utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the
goods. In addition, the competitive interest in copying product designs is more substantial
than in the case of packaging, containers, labels, and related subject matter. Product designs
are therefore not ordinarily considered inherently distinctive and are thus normally protected
only upon proof of secondary meaning.
Id.; see also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection:An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1380 (1987)
("To say that the overall design of a useful article is 'inherently distinctive' of a particular source just
by examining it and perhaps dissecting it, seems to me an impermissible exercise of intuitive judging.
It substitutes an impression that the design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the
proof of association with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add up to a showing of secondary
meaning."); William F. Gaske, Comment, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an
Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1139 (1989) (reasoning that while the
inherent distinctiveness test is appropriate for package design, it is not for product design).
136. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994).
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said that to be properly classified as inherently distinctive trade dress, a product
shape must be (1) unusual and memorable, meaning that it is "striking or
unusual in appearance," (2) conceptually separable from the product, and (3)
likely to serve as an indicator of source.137 Applying this new test, the Third
Circuit held that a plastic container for plants that was shaped like a Grecian
urn did not meet this more rigorous standard and was found
to be neither
138
inherently distinctive nor possessed of secondary meaning.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took the opposite view,
saying that there was no basis in the Two Pesos case to differentiate between
trade dress in packaging and product configuration; the same test should apply
to both. 139 What these courts are really in disagreement about is how to finetune the balance between free competition and consumer deception. The
greater the burden placed on the plaintiff in a section 43(a) trade dress case, the
easier it is for competitors to copy shapes and designs that consumers want and
sell them at competitive prices.
G. Trade Dress in Marketing Themes and Styles of Doing Business
In theory, the concept of trade dress exclusivity under section 43(a) should
not be stretched to give marketplace exclusivity to a vague and abstract image
or marketing theme. In general, the courts have been fairly consistent in
adhering to this goal of preserving free competition in marketing themes and
business styles." However, plaintiffs' attorneys are continually and relentlessly pressing at the margin in asserting that trade dress rights reside in advertising
methods and styles of doing business. Recently, courts have been formulating
new doctrines to limit expansion of trade dress rights in such cases.
The Second Circuit has taken the trademark concept of genericness and
applied it in the trade dress setting to put a limit on nonmeritorious claims of
trade dress in generalized concepts. The court held that trade dress cannot be
granted to "an idea, a concept or a generalized type of appearance." 4 '
Otherwise, trade dress law would undermine the restrictions of copyright and
patent law and prevent the free copying of such unprotectable concepts.
137. Id. at 1434. But see Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1995). The
Stuart Hall court rejected this prong of the Duraco test and held that there need be no showing that
the trade dress is "memorable or striking." "A particular trade dress can be arbitrary and different from
others in the field, without being particularly 'striking or memorable' in the sense in which the district
court used these words." Id.
138. Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d at 1454.
139. Stuart Hall Co., 51 F.3d at 788 ("We decline to create a distinction between protection of
packaging and protection of product configuration, as such a distinction would run contrary to the
holding of Two Pesos.").
140. See, e.g., Woodsmith Pub. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1248 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Protection of a marketing approach [as trade dress] under [Lanham Act] section 43(a) would be inconsistent
with the goals of our free enterprise system."); Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1986)
(ruling that the concept of "informal country dining" cannot be validly claimed as trade dress);
Haagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Gladje, Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ruling that Haagen-Dazs
has no protection for a marketing theme of promoting Scandinavian-type premium ice cream).
141. Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Dubbing such unprotectable generalized concepts as "generic," the court held
that no trade dress protection could be given to greeting cards cut to the shape
of an animal, person or object depicted in a color photo on the front of the
card.142 While the concept of unprotectable "generic" designations developed
in the context of words that name a genus of product,143 the "generic" concept
was used here to denote a generalized product concept that should remain free
for use by all competitors. Other courts have refused to protect a "generic" or
commonly used product design by imposing higher than usual standards of proof
on the likelihood of confusion issue. 144
H. Functionality of Trade Dress: Does Section 43(a) Intrude on the
Domain of Patents?
In order to accommodate trade dress law to the policies of patent law and
of free competition, the common law early developed the rule that no trade
dress or trademark rights could validly be claimed in "functional" shapes or features.145 While the functionality doctrine is followed by all courts as a matter
of public policy, there is no mention of it in the text of the Lanham Act.
There are two rationales underlying the functionality bar: (1) accommodation to the principle that there is only one legal source of exclusive rights in

utilitarian features-utility patent law, "4 and (2) preserving effective competi-

tion by ensuring that competitors can copy features that they need to "compete
effectively."' 47 The number of alternative designs available is often used as a
142. Id. at 33; see Mana Products, Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Mana Products court reasoned that "where it is the custom in a particular industry to package
products in a similar manner, a trade dress done in that style is likely to be generic." While the court
used the term "generic," it apparently only meant it as the opposite of "inherently distinctive," for the
court went on to see if there was evidence of secondary meaning, but found none in plaintiff's common
design of a black plastic makeup compact. Id. at 1069-71.
143. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 12.01, at 12-4 to 12-5.
144. Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1995). Where the alleged trade dress
for brooms consisted of one vertical band of bristles of any contrasting color, the court reasoned that
"since adding a colored stripe is hardly a distinctive way of marking a product," the plaintiff must
present some evidence that consumers would in fact be deceived by the defendant's similar broom. The
court concluded that the "[plaintiff's] narrative of possible confusion cannot be regarded as better than
a hypothesis, and a hypothesis that has not been tested." Id. at 1363-64.
145. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 7.26.
146. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995). The Qualitex court ruled
that
[tihe functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by
protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a
producer to control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark
law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or
functions for a limited time, 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the
innovation. If a product's functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a
monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as
patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity).
Id.; see also Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[Platent law, not trade
dress law, is the principal means for providing exclusive rights in useful product features.").
147. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 ("'In general terms, a product feature is functional' and cannot serve
as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use of purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
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guide to compliance with the second rationale. In resolving the issue of trade
dress functionality, some courts place weight on one rationale while other courts
place all the emphasis on the other. In the author's view, both policies are
important as guides to the ultimate decision of whether a certain feature or
design is to be dubbed "functional" and hence, absent a utility patent, free for
all to use and copy.
Courts that define functionality solely in terms of preserving effective
competition have sometimes painted themselves into a semantic corner. For
example, the Eighth Circuit in the 1995 Vornado case defined functionality
solely in terms of the availability to competitors of alternative designs." If
there was a reasonable number of other designs available, then the design was
not "functional," even if the design was once the subject of a utility patent. 4 9
This led the court to the peculiar conclusion that a formerly patented shape can
be one competitor's exclusive property as trade dress upon proof of inherent
distinctiveness or secondary meaning." The court then had to devise a new
public policy to escape from the conundrum it created for itself by its one-sided
definition of functionality. The court found relief in the policy of patent law,
which permits the free competitive use of a configuration covered by an expired
patent."' Therefore, the court concluded that even a configuration "non-

of the article,' that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage."); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,774 (1992) ("The
Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, if it is one of a limited
number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition would be unduly
hindered by according the design trademark protection."); see also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross
Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that the "ultimate question" is whether the
copier is able to "compete effectively" without copying the senior user's design); Brunswick Corp. v.
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that the functionality issue "should turn on
whether the protection of the configuration would hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of
others to compete effectively in the sale of goods").
148. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (8th Cir. 1995) ("If
competitors need to be able to make an equally competitive product, it is functional, but if they do not,
it may be nonfunctional. The availability of equally satisfactory alternatives for a particular feature, and
not itsinherent usefulness, is often the fulcrum on which Lanham Act functionality turns." (emphasis
added)).
149. Id. at 1506. The Vornado court reasoned that
despite what appears to be a widespread perception that product configurations covered by
utility patents are automatically functional for Lanham Act purposes, the district court in our
case ably demonstrated that this is not so. Configurations can simultaneously be patentably
useful, novel, and non-obvious and also nonfunctional, in trade dress parlance.
Id.
150. This could be the situation where a given patented technology has several marketplace
alternatives. Each available design is "utilitarian" in a patent and engineering sense, but lack of the
ability to use any one design does not bar effective competition.
151. See, e.g., Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[O]nce the '994
patent expires, the public will be entitled to practice the invention claimed in the patent."); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) ("For almost 100 years it has been
well established that in the case of an expired patent, the federal patent laws do create a federal right
to 'copy and use."'); Application of Shakespeare Co., 289 F,2d 506, 508 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("[Wlhen the
patent expires, freedom to utilize that process and whatever advantages it may have is a public right
which cannot be interfered with by alleged trademark rights."); Kellogg Co. v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111, 120 (1938) ("[O]n termination of a patent there passes to the public the right to make the machine

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 59: No. 2

functional" under the law of trade dress (under the court's narrow definition)
must be free for all to copy if such a configuration was "a significant inventive
component" of an invention covered by a utility patent. That is, in this clash
of policies, patent law policy trumps trade dress law policy and freedom to copy
is the rule:
We hold that where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility
patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect of the
invention.... so that without it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same
invention, patent15law
prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the configuration
2
is nonfunctional.

Ix
FREE SPEECH, PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT, AND SECTION 43(a)

The common law has long recognized the commercial tort called "product
disparagement" or "trade libel." Briefly stated, the tort of product disparagement is committed when one publishes with the requisite state of mind a false
statement of fact disparaging another's goods or services which is proven to
have caused a specific loss of sales.15 3 Until the statutory changes effective in
1989, the courts interpreted section 43(a) as purely an anti-false advertising
statute, not as a prohibition on product disparagement. 1"4 But in 1989, for the
first time, product disparagement claims were permitted under federal law in the
revised version of section 43(a).'55
The distinction is that while false advertising laws prohibit certain false
claims about one's own goods or services, product disparagement law prohibits
certain false claims about another's goods or services. The distinction is more

than one of form. The law has traditionally treated the two kinds of commercial

false statements very differently, with two separate sets of laws governed by
different rules.

Constitutional free speech constraints on the two sets of laws of false
advertising and product disparagement have been interpreted as having very
different impacts. While constitutional free speech principles have had relatively
little impact upon false advertising law,15 6 they have a considerably greater
in the form in which it was constructed during the patent."); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §
7.29, at 7-170.2 to 7-170.3.
152. Voranda, 58 F.3d at 1510 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112); see Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.,
65 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating in dictum that it is not necessary for a utility patent to
specifically include an element in a claim of the patent to remove that element as a candidate for trade
dress protection: "What the public receives [upon expiration of the patent] is the entire invention as
disclosed in the claims but primarily in the patent specifications which are required").
153. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.0914], at 27-138.
154. Id. § 27.09[2], at 27-128.
155. This statutory change was very simply accomplished by rephrasing the statute so that it included
not only misrepresentations about the nature of the defendant's goods or services, but also those about
"another person's goods, services, or commercial activities." Thus, with the mere addition of the two
words "another person's," the law of product disparagement became federalized.
156. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.07[3][a]. But see Semco, Inc. v Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108
(6th Cir 1995) (characterizing alleged false advertising in a scientific article as "commercial speech"
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impact on product disparagement law. One explanation for the distinction is
that free speech principles have relatively little to do with the determination of
the truth or falsity of allegedly misleading advertising claims about a company's
own goods and services because who should know better than the advertiser as
to what is true and false about its own products?157
On the other hand, product disparagement claims concern a publication
critical of another person's or corporation's goods and services. Likely target
defendants include not only competitors, but media, business, and academic
commentators. The content of such messages are likely to be of public concern
and interest. These are all good reasons for the First Amendment's concern for
providing breathing space for the exercise of free speech.
The issue facing the federal courts is whether the 1989 federalization of the
tort of product disparagement in section 43(a) will mean the incorporation of
the common law elements of the product disparagement tort such as intent and
a detailed proof of special damages or, on the other hand, adoption of the false
advertising principles of section 43(a), which do not require such elements. 58
So far, one court has held that product disparagement claims, when asserted
under section 43(a), do not trigger the heightened constitutional protections
afforded allegedly defamatory noncommercial speech. 159
In the author's opinion, the limitations and conditions imposed by the
common law on the tort of product disparagement were carefully developed
over many years to protect writers and speakers on commercial subjects from
being harassed and intimidated by lawsuits from those whose products were the
target of unfavorable criticism. Those limitations and conditions should not be
thoughtlessly thrown out simply because Congress has expanded section 43(a)
to include such claims in a federal law with no history of product disparagement
coverage. It would ignore the history of the law to unthinkingly import the
rules of false advertising law developed under the pre-1989 version of section

under Constitutional rules, thereby triggering § 43(a) coverage).
157. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980). The
court ruled that
[t]wo features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial
speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well
situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying
activity .... In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy
breed of expression that is not "particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation.
lId; see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) ("In light of the greater potential
for deception or confusion in the context of certain advertising messages,... content-based restrictions
on commercial speech may be permissible.").
158. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27.09[4].
159. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 937 (3d Cir. 1990). The
court ruled that claims of false advertising and product disparagement do not trigger heightened
constitutional protection because they relate to purely "commercial" speech. In such a case, the lower
court erred in applying the New York Times standard, for "[t]he heightened protection of the actual
malice standard is not 'necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment."' lId
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43(a) into the very different field of product disparagement as included in the
post-1989 version of section 43(a).
Whether through the use of statutory interpretation or concern for free
speech, traditional protections for commentators and critics on business and
commercial affairs must not be abandoned in the process of federalization of the
tort. It is important to create critical breathing space for legitimate comment
and criticism about products and services.16 On the other hand, there is a
need for a meaningful state or federal remedy against intentional falsification
of facts about a product that demonstrably causes a loss of sales. Such a
remedy should be available against both the competitor bent on gaining market
share as well as against the non-competitor who, perhaps motivated by spite or
extremism, publishes false, disparaging, and injurious facts about a company's
goods or services.
X
CONCLUSION

Beginning its life in 1946 as a very minor actor in the revision of an Act
primarily devoted to trademark registration, section 43(a) has undergone a
remarkable metamorphosis. This change occurred through the process of caseby-case interpretation and expansion by the federal courts, approved and
codified by Congress. By its fiftieth birthday, section 43(a) had achieved
widespread fame as a "super-star statute." This section was either the
compatriot or adversary of almost every commercial attorney because it had
become the premier federal law for the assertion in private litigation of claims
against (1) infringement of unregistered marks, names, and trade dress, and (2)
almost all forms of false advertising and product disparagement.
Expansive claims of "trade dress" infringement under section 43(a) have led
to a wave of court of appeals' decisions placing new limits on such claims. In
the future, these new limits will considerably restrain over-expansive claims of
trade dress in litigation. And in the newly "federalized" area of product
disparagement, the federal courts will be faced with difficult questions of how
to balance properly commercial speech under the First Amendment against
claims of false and injurious statements about the plaintiff's goods and services.
Fifty years after passage, the proper use and scope of section 43(a) has
become an important issue in the traditional battle between the competing
policies of fair competition and free competition. Before passage of the
Lanham Act, such issues were largely played out in the context of state common
law. Today, the battleground is section 43(a).
160. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 519 (1991) ("[P]rotection for rational
interpretation serves First Amendment principles by allowing an author the interpretative license that
is necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources."); Hart-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) ("Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of
ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of
'breathing space' so that protected speech is not discouraged.").

